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Nishida’s Thought
Ueda sh izu teru
The task entrusted to me within the framework of this sym­posium1 is to speak on the philosophy of Nishida Kitard (1870- 1945). Our theme "Beyond East and West”  may sound a bit ostenta­
tious, but in my understanding, it refers not simply to a unified world, 
where one can journey easily from east to west by plane or view the 
same events in either East or West on television. Implied here, rather, 
is the opening-up of a single, boundless world embracing both East 
and West, and informed by a principle not simply either East or West, 
but transcending both East and West alike. If we had to present such a 
principle from the Eastern side, we would be faced with the difficult 
problem of deciding what that could possibly be.
With regard to Nishida, I propose to discuss four topics. First o f all, 
what was Nishida pursuing as a philosopher? Here I want to illustrate 
Nishida’s thinking by a single concrete example, which I shall treat in 
considerable detail. Secondly, how did Nishida regard the problem of 
“ East and West” that constituted the historical situation in which he,
1 This is a translation of “ Nishida KitarO no Shisaku” in Keiken to
jikaku: Nishida tetsugaku no basho o motomete & Jt:
[Experience and Self-Awareness: In Search of Nishida’s “ Place”] (Tokyo: Iwanami, 
1994), pp. 1-30. It was originally a paper delivered at the symposium “ Beyond East 
and West,”  organized by the Goethe Institute in Kyoto in September 1991.
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as a philosopher, was placed? I shall first say something in general 
about this and afterwards dwell for a moment on the problem of Zen 
and philosophy as it presents itself in Nishida’s case. And then return­
ing once again to Nishida's philosophy, I will investigate briefly how 
Nishida conceived of experience in the philosophy of pure experience 
(junsui keiken no tetsugaku) that was his critical point of departure, 
and also examine how the problem of Zen and philosophy is dynami­
cally at work in the structure of An Inquiry into the Good (Zen no ken- 
kyQ; 1911) in which he developed his philosophy of pure experience. 
Finally, in view of the fact that, Nishida’s philosophy evolves from 
its original standpoint of pure experience into that of self-awareness 
(jikaku) and later into that of basho (place or topos), 1 want to 
consider what is implied by those changes and the sequence in which 
they occur.
Nishida's Philosophical Quest
Let us first examine Nishida’s way of thinking by a concrete exam­
ple. Nishida wrote, “ All experiential knowledge must be accompanied 
by ‘I am conscious of it’” (4:279). In this case, the “ I”  must not be “ a 
subjective unity (shugoteki toitsu), but a predicative unity; not a point, 
but a circle; not a thing, but a place”  (4:279). This is why in Japanese 
he says “watashi ni”  (something is conscious to me or in me) and not 
“ watashi ga" (I, as subject, am conscious). Since it may be difficult to 
grasp from this one quotation the full implication of what is happening 
here, I shall elaborate on it a bit more.
When Nishida makes the above statement, he takes his lead from 
Kant’s basic tenet that “ the consciousness of 'Ich denke' (I think) must 
be able to accompany every one of my representations.” However, 
while following Kant’s line of reasoning, Nishida expresses a view of 
his own, different from that of Kant, namely, that the “ I” wherein 
something becomes conscious is the place (basho) in which things are 
reflected and made manifest, and that consciousness is precisely this. 
When this is called my consciousness, it does not mean that the “ I” 
exists from the beginning as “ I,” but rather that the “ I” is this very com­
ing to consciousness. Such an “ I”  is nothing but self-awareness; that 
is, it is not that “ I”  am self-aware, but that self-awareness is “ I.” 
Nishida tried to conceive of the act of “ knowing”  from such a self-
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awareness. From that point of view, Nishida maintains that the “ I”  of 
Kant’s “ I think”  must, in fact, be called a “ place of experience,”  a 
place “ in which the logical as well as the sensory are located.”
Is there anything in our experience that can serve as a clue to under­
standing this way of thinking? When we speak in Japanese, we natural­
ly say, “ The sound of the bell can be heard”  (kane no oto ga kikoeru). 
In most languages this same phenomenon would be expressed different­
ly; in English we would say, “ I hear the sound of the bell.” In this 
case, the logical subject “ I” can be said to immediately emerge or issue 
from the experience—a pattern in which the experience is reconstructed 
from the “ I .”  In the Japanese mode of speech, however, becoming con­
scious is simply a matter of the bell’s resounding and its resounding be­
coming manifest. Here, there is no need to make special recourse to an 
“ I” ; instead, an “ I”  that is not called “ I”  becomes, dispassionately as 
it were, the place of experience. Confronting us here is something fun­
damentally different from the mode in which the “ I” emerges right 
from the beginning, with the experience being reconstituted or restruc­
tured as a function of that “ I .”  The sound of the bell comes to be 
heard originally at a point prior to that activity of the “ I .”  If we want 
to speak of an “ I ,”  it is in the sense that the very fact of the bell com­
ing to be heard is the “ I .” It is not that the “ I”  as the subject hears, 
but that the place wherein the ringing of the bell as such becomes 
manifest is the “ I .”  That is the original state of affairs that obtains 
when “ something becoming conscious to me.” Consequently, we can 
already speak here of a “ self-awareness,”  but this self-awareness is, 
in its primary mode, not the self-awareness of an “ I ,” but the very 
fact that the ringing of the bell has become manifest; this is the pri­
mary sense of self-awareness. Within that self-awareness one comes 
to speak, secondarily, of an “ I .”  The later Nishida—if we may 
look ahead for a moment—will say: “ When the world comes to self- 
awareness, I come to self-awareness.”  This does not mean that Nishi­
da does not speak of an “ I ,”  but he implies that the “ I”  is spoken of 
and can be spoken of only on the basis of a preceding and more funda­
mental state of affairs.
However, the uttering of the word “ I” triggers a very startling chain 
of events. The moment one says “ I ,” one takes it in such a way that it 
is as if this “ I” exists from the very beginning and is the origin of every­
thing—beginning with itself. This appeared to Nishida to be a kind of
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fundamental reversal or inversion. Consequently, if one wants to be 
true to the original scheme of things, one must speak of the “ I”  in 
the sense that the event of the bell coming to be heard is the “ I.” At 
the same time, in order to safeguard that originality, one must negate 
the “ I” (negating the “ I”  while saying “ I” ), or once more speak of 
“ I,”  but this time implying its negation. Expressing this moment 
formally by itself, we could say—in a manner different from the direct 
self-identity of “ I is I” —that the “ I is I because it is not I.”  And this 
is precisely the prototype of the “ contradictory self-identity”  to which 
the later Nishida would often refer. The phrase “ I am I without being 
I”  certainly sounds abstract, formalistic, and contradictory in the ex­
treme. It is, however, the form that originates when the hearer becomes 
one with the fact that the sound of the bell is heard, and expresses that 
moment from the side of the “ I.”
It may be remarked here, incidentally, that, once Nishida arrived at 
the point of speaking of the “ I-Thou” as a “ fundamental category” 
virtually in the same sense as Martin Buber, Nishida located the Thou, 
very concretely, in the point of that “ not being I,” as the other “ who is 
not I”  and faces the “ I.”  In that vein, he then said, “ At the ground of 
the I there is Thou,” and “ At the ground of the Thou there is I” 
(6:381).
Above I used a Japanese sentence as an example. I did not intend to 
suggest thereby that there are different ways of thinking or structures 
of consciousness according to the different expressions found in vari­
ous languages. I believe that the state of affairs expressed by the above 
Japanese usage can be an original and universal one. Some time ago, 
when asked to speak at a German university, I presented the same idea 
in German by saying, “7c/z bin, indem ich nicht ich bin, ich”  and the 
philosophers in the audience told me afterwards that they had under­
stood that point very well. Nonetheless, the fact that I have referred to 
a Japanese sentence as my starting point to disclose an original state of 
affairs is certainly not intended to mean that we Japanese are more in 
touch with original reality. As the Japanese propensity to avoid the 
word “ I” lessens, the opposite attitude is becoming increasingly 
manifest, and the “ I ” expressed by Japanese in that new vein must be 
said to be a strongly assertive one. My intent here was merely to 
explore the kind of characteristics displayed when one says, “ The
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sound of the bell is heard,” as opposed to saying, “ I hear the bell.”
Given the above discussion, one can raise several basic objections to 
the usual way of thinking espoused by Kant and others. Even from the 
ordinary way of saying, “ I hear the sound of the bell,” philosophical 
analysis as commonly practiced will conclude that there are things 
given to the “ I.” One comes to say, “ I hear the sound of the bell,” 
when things (usually called the material or matter) are given the “ I,” 
which then proceeds to assemble them. It is not necessarily clear or 
self-evident, however, that, from the standpoint of the “ I,”  one ought 
to interpret what exactly is given. Is what is given simply material for 
the act of cognition? What is given for the act of cognition is, original­
ly, something given prior to the act of cognition. Hence, to interpret, 
from a cognitive standpoint, that that which is given before the act of 
thinking is sense material or matter, for instance, is already to make 
many presuppositions. When the given is taken to be given to the think­
ing “ I ” (as in Kant’s case), that given divides into two things: the 
material and the Ding an sich (the thing-in-itself). On the one hand, it 
is the material for “ my” thought, and on the other hand—as a Ding an 
sich—it is a limitation to “ my” thought. But, as I just stated, this does 
not necessarily provide a basis for interpreting what is given to me 
from the standpoint of the “ I.”  It is rather that the “ I”  (the ego) 
projects itself into the thing-in-itself and works the division into sense 
material and Ding an sich. In another context, with an eye to the origi­
nality of experience, Nishida accordingly reinterprets Kant as follows: 
“ For example, what Kant calls Ding an sich is the concrete, direct 
experience before our thinking has worked upon it and added to it.2
To come to an understanding of Nishida’s thinking on this point one 
more quotation may be helpful:
The given fact is not “ this bird” flying, but “ this bird 
flying.” . . . However, the very fact-in-itself that is ex­
pressed in this phrase views the self as the present content that 
determining the self, and even the so-called “ I” that sees this 
fact is determined in accordance with it. (6:168)
2 In this sentence, I summarize texts by Nishida, to be found in his Collected Works, 
vol. 2 , p. 339 and vol. 4 , p. 12.
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Taking reality “ before the opposition of subject and object*’ as 
the point of departure, while sticking to the most immediate and con­
crete facts and further maintaining that they become the original self- 
awareness of the subject that is “ without I” in its adaptation to these 
facts—these are the characteristics of Nishida’s fundamental stand­
point, which remains unaltered from beginning to end. In other words, 
it is the resolve to think, not from the thought, but from the world of 
reality, wherein also the act of thinking is pursued.
The Problem o f East and West
Currently, Nishida’s philosophy is becoming well known in Europe 
and especially in America, and it appears to be having some impact. 
The great artery that has been running for thousands of years beneath 
European philosophy, or the way of thinking that forms the back­
ground of the European thought structure is, in ontology, for instance, 
the idea of substance, that is, the structure of essence and phenom­
enon. In logical terms, it is the principle of identity or the scheme of 
subject-object thinking, or again the distinction between sensation and 
reason. Linking all these together as the common basis was the idea 
of a transcendental, substantial God or, in modern times, the idea of a 
transcendental subject. At present, however, that way of thinking is 
being questioned in different ways within European philosophy itself, 
and Nishida’s impact may be connected with that crisis.
As to East and West, there is no need now to discuss which of the 
two should come first or whether the two can be separated so clearly. 
Historically speaking, that is a delicate problem. In my talk here, 
I want to speak of the West that we Japanese have historically 
experienced since the coming of Perry’s black ships at the end of the 
feudal period and the opening of the country with the Meiji Restora­
tion (1868), and of the Eastern tradition that, at least until then, had 
been the basis of life and culture in Japan. In a sense, Nishida’s situa­
tion was very different from ours today. Still, the problem that Nishida 
faced and with which he struggled is not solved even today. It is only 
buried under the impression that the world has become one, and it is 
sure to resurface whenever anything untoward happens. It was 
Nishida’s generation that experienced that problem in its original 
form. Since Nishida had his roots in the Eastern tradition, his encoun-
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ter with the West was a turbulent one, given the brusque way the West 
first made inroads into the East. He experienced the West as a totality, 
and even while looking only at philosophy, he was confronted all at 
once with the whole range of elements that formed the history of Euro­
pean thought, from Greek philosophy and Christianity, to modem 
scientific thinking and contemporary philosophy (up to Husserl and 
Meinong). In a word, Nishida found himself at the exact point where 
East and West collided with one another full force.
A generation later, things were already very different. Specialists had 
appeared, for example, in Greek philosophy, and specialized studies 
were advancing in leaps and bounds. In the case of specialists, how­
ever, an interest in and understanding of Christianity, for instance, 
would have been minimal; there were those who would concentrate 
on Descartes, Kant, or Hegel, but would hardly touch on Plato and Ar­
istotle, just as there were those who specialized in modern scientific 
thinking, but would show virtually no interest in religion. In Nishida’s 
case we can detect none of this narrowness. He experienced the full con­
frontation of East and West as they threw themselves against each 
other headlong, like rival floats crashing into one another at a matsun. 
Everything—religion, philosophy, science—was called into question 
together, and it made for a situation in which human existence in all its 
aspects became fundamentally problematic. That was also manifested 
itself in the way things were studied then, but we have no time to enter 
into that now.
Let me now cite a few quotations to show how Nishida thought of 
the problem of East and West.
East and West are two separate realities [Nishida speaks here 
from bitter experience] . . . but in their ground they are 
linked and mutually complementary. [However,] it is not pos­
sible to conceive of a world culture in which East and West 
are one, without discovering that deeper ground. (14:406)
I think that the East has something radically different. [If 
we can discover that deeper ground,] will not then East and 
West form a human culture in mutual complementarity, and 
thus manifest complete humanity? (14:405)
The * ‘deeper ground” Nishida alludes to here is one that can be
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reached only after one has overcome one’s own culture. We may think 
here of Merleau-Ponty’s idea that “ in order not to be a prisoner of 
one’s own culture, one must recover one’s own ‘wild region,’ which en­
ables us to communicate with other cultures.” 3 But is it, after all, possi­
ble to recover one’s own wild nature? Were this possible, it would not 
only revitalize our own culture, but would also enable us to truly com­
municate with other cultures for the first time; it would thus serve as 
the ground on which a new world culture could take shape. As the term 
“ wild region” suggests, it is a region untainted by our own particular 
culture, a region we are brought into contact with only after the hard­
ened shells of our own cultural forms have been broken through. 
When Nishida spoke of “ pure experience,”  he must have been think­
ing of a situation wherein our wild nature is reached.
The Philosophy o f  Pure Experience
I want to reflect here a moment on the meaning of experience in the 
term pure experience. Experience is a word used in everyday language; 
it is also one of the basic terms of philosophy. In the history of Europe­
an philosophy we encounter various conceptions of experience. There 
are, for example, Aristotle’s concept of experience, the British em­
piricist concept, Hegel’s science of the experience of consciousness, 
and Heidegger’s “ from the experience of thinking.”  As far as termi­
nology goes, Nishida’s use of the term “ pure experience” harks back 
directly to William James. But when it comes to ascertaining what 
that term basically means for Nishida, I believe the following can be 
said. When we speak of experiencing something, we usually under­
stand the term experience as including a simultaneous understanding 
of what we experience, and even some kind of self-understanding. This 
self-understanding means basically understanding things in a mode 
that can be expressed in words; words are thus woven into the experi­
ence. It is here that Nishida felt that such an understanding was prob­
lematic. Indeed, in the mode of experiencing that can be expressed in 
words, right from the beginning (as is supposed when we say that we 
experienced this or that), a kind of reversal seems to have taken place.




It is as if we have experienced that which is being expressed in the words 
we use, as if experience occurs only in a form that can be expressed in 
language, as if words are what constitute the experience (as if experi­
ence is a construction of the speaking subject). Nishida realized that 
such an understanding of experience makes it impossible for us to truly 
enter into the Sache itself, and he therefore tried to break it down. 
Nishida’s pure experience thus implies that experience is an original 
event in which, by breaking down the linguistic structures, the Sache is 
encountered for the first time and that this event itself becomes a new 
impulse for putting that experience into words.
An Infinite Opening
Above we saw how, for Nishida, the creation of a single world cul­
ture integrating East and West was possible only by the discovery of a 
deeper ground. Having encountered the West while remaining rooted 
in the Eastern tradition, Nishida made the following two observations 
with regard to the creation of that world culture. One was—a much- 
cited phrase of his—“ to see the form of the formless”  (4:6). He then 
adds that he would like to open up a philosophical standpoint from 
which the meaning of that way of experience would become transpar­
ent. His desire to do so is certainly not to force Eastern culture on other 
people; he is making a new effort to create, rather, a more all-embracing 
world that also subsumes within itself the values of Eastern culture, 
whose roots differ from those of the West. And for Nishida—this, his 
second point—that new effort is strongly linked with learning. He 
expresses this in many ways, but I shall restrict myself to only one, 
which is more readily understandable. Regarding science, Nishida 
wrote the following passage:
Since the Meiji Restoration, our country has been taking in 
Western culture pellmell. Those who speak rather flippantly 
of wakon kansai [or wakon ydsai] (“ Japanese spirit and 
Chinese [or Western] learning [or crafts]” ) in this connection 
may think that one can use these things merely as tools. They 
forget that every one of these things has a spirit of its own. 
Even the natural sciences carries a spirit proper to the natural 
sciences. We must digest these things by grasping each in its
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particular spirit. (12:162)
In these simple words Nishida expresses an important message when it 
comes to opening oneself to the West: as to the natural sciences, we 
must learn the spirit inherent in the natural sciences. Nishida’s texts are 
rich in variations on this theme. He will say, for instance, that from 
now on Eastern culture must be scholarly or that it must have logic. In 
saying this, however, he does not imply that Western scholarship and 
logic can directly become the model for the world culture of the future. 
While stressing the necessity of passing through these forms, he de­
mands a scholarship and logic where the mode of experience in which 
one “ sees the form of the formless”  becomes significant. I think that 
this signals an epoch-making new task, a demand so tremendously 
difficult as to sound preposterous.
Much more needs to be said about this problem, but I shall concen­
trate only on the main points. First of all, the need for a “ deeper 
ground” appears as an extremely important desideratum in Nishida’s 
view. Secondly, when we speak of “ East” and “ West”  we tend to 
align the two, but in Nishida there is the sense that East and West both 
form their own separate spheres. For him, it is certainly not the case 
that the two would naturally form one world in which they both har­
moniously coalesce; rather, a great gap lies between them. To be able 
to speak of “ East and West” in the sense of spanning that gap, it is 
necessary, in Nishida’s own words, that a place be opened up in which 
both East and West “ are located,”  an opening that embraces and sub­
sumes both. We may bandy about terms such as “ global world”  or con­
cepts such as “ mankind”  or “ humanity,” but the problem is not that 
simple. If our experience is not directly infused with a sense of wide 
“ opening” in some form or other, it does not become an open 
experience. And this renders us incapable of conceiving a new principle 
for a unified world that can withstand the pressure of contradictions 
involved in the relationship of East and West.
In connection with that deep sense of a wide open space, we may re­
mind ourselves especially of Nishida’s fondness for the sea. Bom near 
the sea on the Noto peninsula, as a middle school teacher in Nanao he 
would go to the harbor whenever his duties allowed, to gaze out at the 
sea. Once a villager asked him what he was doing, and he replied, “ I’m 
watching the sea; the sea is something mysterious.”  Then asked what
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he was thinking, he said, “ I’m thinking of the world.” This anecdote is 
related in Nishitani’s essay, “ Nishida, My Teacher” (1951).4 Later, 
Nishida himself wrote, “ I love the sea. I have the feeling that in the sea 
something infinite is at work.” And Nishitani has left the words: “ The 
expanse o f the sky is infinity become visible.” This feeling common to 
both Nishida and Nishitani is noteworthy in that it points to an im­
portant dimension in their thought. In seeing the sky or the sea, they 
both had the feeling of experiencing a kind of infinite “opening up,” 
wherein East and West, among other things, are “ located” ; or again, 
in their sense for sea and sky an infinite opening is taking place. If one 
is to speak at all of going beyond East and West, it must be there. 
Without a foundation in this living experience, whatever kind of 
thought system one may build, it would only have a limited frame­
work, would be apt to fade with time, and be subject to change. Thus, 
an opening that is merely a product of thought may eventually revert to 
a crude attitude of ethnocentric closedness and opposition.
In keeping with the problematic of Nishida’s age, I have treated the 
problem as one of East and West, but in our present consciousness it is 
further complicated by the North-South opposition. In this case too, 
we would be unable to conceive o f a common bond strong enough to 
withstand the inherent stresses, were it not for the Zen-inspired sense 
of “ since originally there is no East or West, where could we look for a 
North or a South?”
Nishida and Zen
What really led Nishida to that kind of openness was his practice of 
zazen. In connection with the problem of East and West, we must try 
to obtain a clear picture of the historical conditions in which Nishida 
engaged in Zen practice. An Inquiry into the Good appeared in 1911, 
the year in which Natsume SOseki delivered his famous speech on “The 
Opening Up of Present-day Japan.” In this speech, Sdseki presents a
4 See Nishitani’s Waga shi Nishida Kitard Sensei o  kataru (1951), in his Collected 
Works 9: 15-50 (the anecdote, in a slightly different version, appears on pp. 30-31); 
for an English translation, see “Nishida, My Teacher,” in Nishitani Keiji, Nishida 
KitarO, translated by Yamamoto Seisaku and James W. Heisig (Berkeley: University 
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most revealing description of the spiritual situation in which Japan 
found itself at the time. I cannot go into detail here, but the gist of it is 
as follows.
Sdseki says that, spiritually speaking, the ‘‘opening up” that people 
are talking about is not so different from the situation that existed in 
barbaric times, since it means being frantically engaged in competition 
and antagonism. And since the country is being physically forced to 
open up under special circumstances, the Japanese are, as it were, only 
skating on the surface. Moreover, the fact that they have to keep their 
legs stiff for fear of taking a tumble has made them nervous wrecks. In­
deed, the Japanese are to be pitied, for having been placed in an in­
describably strained situation. Sdseki adds that he himself does not 
know what can be done. “ I can only sigh,” he says.
Still, at that time (right after victory in the Russo-Japanese War), 
Japan looked very successful on the surface. Sdseki thus continued: 
“ One hears on all sides boastful voices saying ‘We have become a 
first-rate nation.’ Yes, you could say that, if you are simpleminded 
enough.” (Today is not very different; only today one would speak of 
having become an economic superpower.) Sdseki had no blueprint 
ready for those who asked him what to do. “ The only face-saving an­
swer I can give is: let us try to change from within, but, if at all possi­
ble, without becoming neurotic.”
We may find these statements by Sdseki intriguing, but the situation 
it describes must be called a difficult one, nay, a dreadful one. When we 
look back on the drastic changes that took place in Japan’s history dur­
ing the Meiji, Taishd, and Shdwa eras from about 1890 onwards, we 
must admit that the situation was really much as Sdseki described it. In 
his History o f Meiji Literature,5 Nakamura Mitsuo makes a significant 
comment about Sdseki. I want to introduce it here because it also has 
bearing on Nishida. Nakamura notes that several of the heroes of 
Sdseki’s novels are “ idlers,” people who deliberately stay aloof from 
society. (The expression “ high-class idlers,”  or “ idle rich,”  in fact ap­
pears in one of the novels.) Nakamura says of them, “ Not doing any­
thing themselves, they criticize the life-style of their contemporaries 
and of people engaged in society. . . . The intelligentsia in Sdseki’s 
novels are seeking an inner norm for their lives, without finding any.
5 Nakamura Mitsuo, M eiji bungakushi (Tokyo: Chikuma shobd, 1963).
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The pen of the author, who takes up the problems that these people en­
counter on various levels o f human life, naturally moves into a critique 
of contemporary society and of the Japanese culture o f the time” (p. 
220). Daisuke, the hero o f Sorekara (And Then), for example, says 
bluntly that “ since the relations between Japan and the West arc all 
wrong and offer no hope for the future, there is nothing for me to do” 
(p. 220). He is, indeed, a typical “ high-class vagabond.” His life-style 
serves no purpose, but for that very reason it becomes a criticism of the 
life-style o f the age and society. Now, assuming that such a thing were 
possible—that one can truly become a critic of society by doing noth- 
ing—then one could say that the practice o f zazen is, in the true sense 
of the word, a total criticism of “ being in the world,” since zazen is 
precisely “to practice doing nothing” in a literal and radical way.
On 5 January 1905, while the town of Kanazawa, where he then 
lived, was noisily celebrating the fall o f Port Arthur with lantern proc­
essions and the like, Nishida wrote in his diary, “ In the morning, 
zazen; in the afternoon, zazen; in the evening, zazen" (17:130). And 
then he added the following remark: “ How frivolous the human 
heart!—to engage in such foolish celebrations without even thinking of 
the long haul still lying ahead.” Zazen is certainly not a way of becom­
ing indifferent to the actualities of history; there are things, rather, that 
become visible precisely by doing nothing while one is surrounded by 
them. In Nishida’s case, it was the things that lay farther ahead that 
became visible, and those things truly came to pass later on. Nishida 
passed away while writing his last essay during a troubled time: in June 
of 1945, a few weeks before the defeat of Japan.
Nishida thus engaged in Zen practice at the historical interface—or 
“ betweenness” —of East and West. He strenuously walked the path of 
Zen, which consists of practicing zazen (meditating in sitting position), 
getting up for an audience with the master, and then returning to 
zazen. He walked the path o f Zen while living out a personal life that 
often made him lament “ the misery o f human life.” Rather than enter­
ing upon the question o f what this signifies as a way of life (which I 
have discussed elsewhere in detail6) I want to concentrate here on Zen 
and philosophy as the form in which the problem of East and West
6 See the section “ A  Zen Life”  in Ueda Shizuteru, Nishida Kitaro o  yom u  [Reading 
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took radical and concrete form in Nishida.
In the ten years preceding the publication of his first philosophical 
work, An Inquiry into the Good (1911), Nishida was voraciously read­
ing the basic works of European philosophy, all the way from the 
Greek classics to the modems, with truly incredible breadth and 
thoroughness—although he himself disparagingly spoke of it as “ ran­
dom reading.'* During these same ten years, however, Nishida was also 
vigorously engaged in Zen practice, that is, zazen under the guidance 
of a master—to the point, as he himself clearly states, of completely 
forgetting about philosophy. Zen and philosophy form a study in con­
trast—one, an Eastern practice; the other, a discipline of reflection that 
originated in the West. This philosophical reflection, moreover, is 
more than simple reflection; it is a high-level kind of reflection that 
reflects also on the nature of reflection itself—a reflection on reflection, 
as it were, that thereby takes on the character of a science. In complete 
contrast, Zen, as an Eastern praxis, which is often characterized as 
“ non-thinking,** stresses precisely the overcoming of reflection.
There lies an immeasurable gap between Zen and philosophy. But, in 
fact, Nishida practiced them both, simultaneously and assiduously, for 
ten years. When the same person engages in two such opposing prac­
tices, something is bound to happen. What happened in Nishida’s self- 
awareness is that he came to take upon himself, in full consciousness, 
the world-historical task of building a world wherein East and West, as 
he saw them, would be one. This meant, however, throwing himself 
body and soul into that qualitative difference and therefore feeling his 
personality being torn internally, right down the middle. While we can 
empathize with the pain that this must have caused him, this entitles us 
to say, as grandiloquent as it may sound, that, in the person of Nishida 
Kitard, for the first time in world history, Zen and European philos­
ophy truly encountered one another.
In Nishida’s person Zen and philosophy came face to face with each 
other directly across the abyss that separates them. What happened 
there can be described more concretely as follows. A “ magnetic field” 
of mutual questioning was generated, in which Zen probed philosophy 
as to the originality of its principles, and, conversely, philosophy 
challenged Zen as to the coherence and concreteness of the world it 
builds. By this process, the philosophical principle made a qualita­
tive leap in depth (in An Inquiry Into the Good it becomes “ pure
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experience”  as the only reality) and, on the other hand, Zen underwent 
an epoch-making development in its world project (Zen itself, stepping 
out of itself in a metamorphosis into philosophy, and reaching the 
point of wanting to “ explain all things with pure experience as the only 
reality” ).
Experience-Self-A wareness-Basho
Among the central questions regarding Nishida’s philosophy we 
must include the following: How are we to conceive of the experience 
that constitutes the starting point of his philosophy? And what does it 
mean that he thought of this experience as pure experience, and that 
this pure experience evolves later into self-awareness and, further, into 
basho (place or topos)!
In an extreme formulation, pure experience is “ the moment of 
seeing a color or hearing a sound, prior to the bifurcation of subject 
and object.” It is an event in which the subject-object framework by 
which we ordinarily interpret experience is broken through. In that 
event, while being opened up to an “ infinite openness,”  one finds one­
self, selflessly, in the midst of a vast and bountiful fullness. One is 
reminded here of DOgen’s statement, “ One is fulfilled by letting go.”  
Nishida considered this event the ground of true reality and the founda­
tion of the true self, and tried to see everything from that perspective.
In the strict sense, the expression “ neither subject nor object”  clear­
ly designates an experience free from all language. It does not point, 
however, to a state of mere quietistic silence, but originally to a primor­
dial event, the Ereignis, which itself becomes the impetus that drives 
us to express that experience in words. When we speak of “ pure 
experience,”  we have already crossed the threshold of language; it has 
become a word of “ self-awareness,”  while oriented in such a way that 
it can be applied as a principle of philosophy. At this point, the ele­
ment of self-awareness comes emphatically to the fore, but it must be 
said that self-awareness here does not simply mean a self-consciousness 
whereby the self knows the self. To begin with, since it opens up within 
pure experience, and thus at a point where there is neither ego nor 
things, it cannot have the form of a “ self-awareness of an ego.”  I think 
it can best be characterized as “ pure experience become self-aware,” or 
again as a state of being opened up to and illumined by an “ infinite
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openness.” Moreover, in the process, the possibility of reflection is 
recovered and the way to explain everything with pure experience as the 
only reality is disclosed.
That is the philosophical standpoint of An Inquiry into the Good. In 
its intention to explain everything, “ reflection”  was already fully at 
work. An Inquiry into the Good still lacked reflection on the very fact 
that reflection is already fully at work, however. Hence it does not 
yet contain a basis for a philosophical standpoint. The link between 
pure experience and the reflection implied in explanation comes to be 
thematized in Nishida’s next major work, Intuition and Reflection 
in Self-Awareness (Jikaku ni okeru chokkan to hansei, 1917).7 We can 
say that this work places itself squarely on the standpoint of self- 
awareness, but we must then clarify what exactly self-awareness means 
in this case. Self-awareness here combines in itself the aspect of being 
“ the self-awareness of pure experience,” as indicated above, and the 
aspect of being “ reflection on reflection.” (Taken by itself, this latter 
aspect corresponds to the self-consciousness addressed by European 
philosophy and to the standpoint of transcendentalism.) A prominent 
characteristic of Nishida’s notion of self-awareness is the fact that in it 
these two aspects completely interpenetrate each other. Once this char­
acteristic comes into clear focus, the notion of basho comes to be 
thematized. This time, “ self-awareness” comes to be thought of as “ a 
place reflecting itself within itself.” It is within this context that “ con­
sciousness” in general also comes to be conceived of as a “ place.”
In that series of essays, the notion of “ place”  appears concretely, 
first of all in connection with the conception of consciousness. So- 
called subsumptive judgments are cited as the basic form of all 
knowledge that is “ located in” consciousness. Here also the “ place” 
character of the predicate is clearly delineated via the original idea that 
the subject is located in the predicate. This then leads to the formula­
tion of an original “ predicative logic,” which, through its develop­
ment into a “ logic of place,” will bestow a decisive and long-range 
significance on Nishida’s philosophy.
From the outset (with the standpoint of pure experience), the theo-
7 For an English translation, sec Nishida Ki tar 0, Intuition and Reflection in Self- 
Consciousness, translated by Valdo H . Viglielmo with Takeuchi Yoshinori and Joseph 
S. O ’Leary (Albany: State University o f New York Press, 1987).
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ries of consciousness and ontology have always gone hand in hand in 
Nishida’s thought, and this does not change with the standpoint of 
“ place.”  From that standpoint, consciousness is seen as a place, but 
the question is also asked where consciousness itself is located (“ the 
place of consciousness” ). The idea of place is then further pursued in 
terms of “ the place where we are located,”  and the “ s e lf’ then comes 
to be defined as “ a being located in” (i.e., a place-related self). Nishida 
then finally conceives of a kind of “ double place” : each place, while 
being a concrete place in its own context, is ultimately located in the 
“ infinite openness,”  disclosed by the event of “ the instant of seeing 
a color or hearing a sound.” In predicative language, Nishida then 
speaks of “ a place of being”  and “ a place of absolute nothingness” — 
terminology that takes on great significance in various contexts.
I believe that we could reformulate this “ double place,”  with a gain 
in generality, as a “ double-opening” (which, however, does not appear 
as double). We could then speak, on the one hand, of “ limited open­
ings” (comprehensively, this would be the “ world”  as the general 
framework of all complexes of meaning) and, on the other, of an 
“ infinite openness”  that embraces and subsumes the former within it­
self while transcending it. I believe that by this reformulation a pattern 
becomes apparent with which we can pursue further what Nishida had 
in mind with the concept of “ place.” (In my talk at a Germany univer­
sity, I translated “ double-opening” as Doppelerschlossenheit.)
With the idea of “ place,” the decisive characteristic of Nishida’s 
thought clearly comes to the fore. This notion constitutes the originali­
ty and enduring significance of Nishida’s philosophy. The idea, how­
ever, was reached on the basis of a very special point of departure: 
pure experience. From that point of view, we can also say that from the 
very outset, Nishida’s conception of pure experience contained what 
later developed from this pure experience into self-awareness and to 
basho. It is due to the nature of that point of departure (i.e., Nishida’s 
concept of pure experience) that the standpoints of self-awareness and 
of place could develop from it, and emerge with the specific character 
they in fact have. We could say that the dynamic concatenation of pure 
experience-self-awareness-place corresponds to the basic relationship 
between experience, the self-understanding of experience, and the 
horizon of that self-understanding; however, the special feature of this 
whole chain is that the starting point of experience lies in pure
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experience. In order to understand what all this means, we must first 
come to a sufficient understanding, via the texts, of what Nishida was 
working on with his idea of place. This, however, is an extremely 
difficult undertaking. Looking back from the final destination, one can 
discern a certain thread running throughout the whole of Nishida’s 
philosophical output, but it is truly difficult to follow that thread 
chronologically, while at the same time grasping the reasoning at each 
node of transition. Still, I want to make a new effort at understanding 
by starting again from pure experience.
The course is clearly laid out, with the various stages that Nishida 
went through on his intellectual pilgrimage serving as our milestones. 
A few fixed points can thus be indicated. First, the notion of basho 
signifies basically that “ all existing things are located in something/* 
in other words, that “ being” means “ being located.** From this idea, 
two predicates are derived: “ a place wherein things are located” and 
“ things that are located (in a place).”  The characteristic traits of this 
conception appear clearly in the “ predicative logic,” which is gradually 
elaborated into a “ logic of place.” In the later Nishida, “ the place 
wherein things are located” is provisionally seen as threefold, but 
finally as the irreducible and invisible twofoldness of “ the place of 
being”  and “ the place of absolute nothingness” ; in other words, the 
world and the limitless margins and bottomless, interlinear spaces of 
the world. As to “ the things that are located,” “ our selves” come to 
be seen as their model. When the accent falls on “ selves,” “ historical 
bodies” are concretely meant, and when “ our” is stressed, the image 
is that of an infinite number of “ individuals upon individuals** against 
the background of logical expressions such as “ an individual is an in­
dividual over against an individual** and “ dying into nothingness and 
arising from nothingness.” And the mode of being that is signified by 
the term “ being located” is conceived of as “ an acting intuition.”  The 
logic of basho as the state of affairs that involves this entire picture 
is then characterized as “ (absolute) contradictory self-identity** (or 
“ place-related self-identity” ). Finally, in his last years, Nishida articu­
lated this further into the two predicates of “ inverse correspondence” 
and “ the bottom of everydayness.*’8
8 The Japanese term, heijotei here translated literally, evidently goes back to
the Zen spirit o f  “ everydayness,”  and carries the nuance o f detachment (Gelassenheit).
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Those are the terms that appear, in broad overview, as indicators of 
the scale, the links, and the directions of Nishida’s thought. I want to 
go on investigating, again and again and at every chance, Nishida’s 
difficult texts, in a quest to understand more exactly what those terms 
mean, what significance they have, and what “ place” Nishida’s logic 
of “place” has in the history o f philosophy.
Translated by Jan Van Bragt
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